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Sean M. Maloney 
The need to project land force power within the confines of the no r the rn portion of the 
North American cont inent may appear , at first 
glance, r idiculous in today's world. In the early 
years of the Cold War, bo th Canada and the 
Uni ted S t a t e s gave credibi l i ty to a l a n d 
suppor ted air th rea t to North America and took 
steps to meet such a contingency. The Canadian 
response was to configure the small, almost 
t o k e n , a c t i v e C a n a d i a n A r m y i n t o a n 
a i r t ranspor table formation called the Mobile 
Striking Force (MSF). Some have suggested 
t ha t the creat ion of the MSF and its operat ions 
in the 1948-1955 period w a s not only a was te 
of resources b u t dis tracted the Canad ian Army 
from t ra in ing for other, more impor tan t t a sks 
which would become apparen t in the 1950s.1 
This may be an accura te assessment , b u t only 
in hindsight . The MSF did provide many 
positive benefits within the greater context of 
pos t -1945 Canad ian defence policy. The aim 
of t h i s s t u d y i s to e x a m i n e t h e MSF ' s 
organization, mission and p lanning in order to 
provide insight into these positive benefits. 
Policy Background 
The policy a n d organizational roots of the MSF extend back to the Second World 
War. The Ogdensburg Agreement of August 
19402 t ha t resul ted in the creation of the 
Canada-Uni ted S ta tes Pe rmanen t Jo in t Board 
of Defence (PJBD) allowed for many forms of 
defence cooperation between the two na t ions 
dur ing the Second World War. In addit ion to 
approving extensive joint const ruct ion projects 
like the land link with Alaska (the Northwest 
Highway System), the CANOL oil project and 
the Northeast Staging Route for aircraft,3 the 
P J B D w a s a l s o t h e c l e a r i n g - h o u s e for 
con t inen ta l defence p l ann ing . The m o s t 
impor tan t aspect of the PJBD in th is regard 
was the unde r s t and ing tha t bo th Canada a n d 
the United Sta tes were equal pa r tne r s in th is 
endeavour. This appears u n u s u a l given the 
obvious dispari t ies in populat ion, military and 
economic potential . In the military sphere , 
where joint command usual ly resides with the 
nat ion with the greatest preponderance of local 
forces, Canada was able to re ta in not only 
operational control b u t strategic direction of 
her military forces after some bit ter infighting.4 
This precedent was t ransferred and reta ined 
into the post-war period, as was the need to 
protect those facilities bui l t dur ing the war. 
After the Second World War, with the rise of 
the Soviet Union as the new enemy, the PJBD 
cont inued in its role as the defence coordinator 
between the U.S. and Canada . To facilitate 
defence planning, the military m e m b e r s of the 
P J B D w e r e f o r m e d i n t o t h e M i l i t a r y 
Coordinating Committee (MCC) of the PJBD in 
1946. Unlike the PJBD which w a s formed to 
"consider the broad sense of the defence of the 
nor the rn half of the wes tern hemisphere , "5 the 
MCC was tasked to develop jo int p l ans which 
would be submi t ted to Canad ian and U.S. 
nat ional military author i t ies for approval and 
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then implemented if a threat developed. In 
September 1946, the MCC developed a joint 
appreciation for defence requirements in North 
America with the intention of revising the 
wartime defence plan, known as ABC-22. 
Developed from a U.S. strategic study called 
PINCHER,6 the MCC's appreciation was based 
on the premise that, by 1950, the Soviets 
would be able to hinder Canadian and U.S. 
industrial capacity in a global war through the 
use of guided missiles, conventional and atomic 
long range bombers, airborne and amphibious 
attack and internal subversion. The MCC 
appreciation emphasized the interdependency 
of Canada and the U.S. in continental defence; 
the U.S. was dependent on bases in Canada to 
project power from its bases in Alaska, 
Greenland and Iceland, while Canadian security 
was dependent upon the need to protect U.S. 
industrial potential that would be applied 
overseas against the Soviet Union and in the 
defence of Europe. The primary obstacle was 
the disparity in the size of military forces and 
Canada's continual insistence on retaining her 
sovereignty by not subordinating her military 
forces to the Americans. To overcome this 
problem, Second World War precedents were 
used to demonstrate that intimate joint 
cooperation could be achieved through the 
establishment of extremely close links between 
the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and 
the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
using the MCC.7 
The Threat 
By October 1946, the U. S. JCS had developed a more complete threat estimate 
and response within the context of PINCHER. 
Known as BROADVIEW, the objective of 
defending North America was to "safeguard 
our military capability by protecting the vital 
elements of our war potential."8 Since 
BROADVIEW provided the context of the 
Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan (BSP), that 
is, the ABC-22 revision, its discussion of 
possible threats to North American security 
was notable. BROADVIEW anticipated that, 
up to 1950, the Soviets could use subversion 
and sabotage by internal groups; covert 
76 
biological and chemical attacks; air attacks 
against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the 
use of airborne irregular forces ranging 
throughout the continent. By 1952, 
BROADVIEW planners projected the use of 
the atomic bomb delivered by long range 
aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland, 
Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of 
Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces.9 
BROADVIEWs estimate of the potential 
threat to North America remained constant 
throughout joint Canadian-U.S. war planning 
in the late 1940s. Consistently, late war plans 
such as BROILER, DOUBLESTAR and 
CROSSPIECE focused on the ability of the 
Soviet Union to use the TU-4 aircraft to attack 
North America.10 The TU-4, codenamed "BULL" 
by NATO, was essentially a "reverse engineered" 
American Boeing B-29 t h a t had been 
impounded by the Soviets in the closing stages 
ofthewar. With a range of 3,450 miles, theTU-
4 could only reach North American targets 
exclusive of Alaska on a one way mission, 
including Hanford, Washington, the only 
plutonium production facility in the United 
States at that time. If the TU-4 could be 
forward based however, two way bombing 
missions were possible.11 Logical candidates 
for forward basing sites included the Aleutians, 
Alaska, Greenland or Newfoundland, that is, 
portions of the Northeast and Northwest Staging 
Routes constructed during the war to support 
the Soviet Union and Europe that were 
scheduled by the Americans for demolition.12 
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Defence p l a n n e r s at the time also 
extrapolated the extensive Soviet experience in 
airborne operations during the war and 
concluded that eight to ten airborne divisions 
existed in the Soviet order of battle, with 5,000 
transport aircraft of the C-47 type; later, copies 
of the DC-4 four-engined transport would 
become available. Although not all would be 
used in a forward base seizure role, enough 
airborne forces and lift existed to pose a problem 
in Alaska and the Aleutians, and possibly 
Greenland as well if Iceland was seized. 
Experience also demonstrated that the Soviets 
were capable of operating brigade-sized 
airborne formations in a partisan support role.13 
It is important to note that in the late 
1940s, no NORAD agreement existed, the 
Distant Early Warning Line had not been 
constructed and the available numbers of long 
range interceptor aircraft were pitifully small. 
Even by 1953, American air defence planners 
believed they could only achieve a 20 per cent 
kill rate against any air attack on North America, 
be it one or two-way.14 It should be noted that 
the Soviets were not able to field a droppable 
atomic bomb before the 1950-1952 time frame. 
The Soviets did, however, develop research 
and production facilities for chemical and 
biological weapons during the war and could 
have had a "poor man's atomic bomb" prior to 
1950 and thus the air threat was a problem.15 
With regards to the popular scenario of the vast 
Soviet hordes descending upon North America 
over the North Pole, the Canada-U.S. BSP 
concluded that: 
A large scale Invasion of the northern portion of the 
Western hemisphere will be beyond potential enemy 
capabilities for many years. However, beginning 
about 1950, a potential enemy might suppor t . . . on 
the order of 6000 men . . . [attacks] against Alaska or 
the Canadian north west . . .16 
The immediate foreseeable threat was not 
an all-out land invasion and occupation of 
North America. Up to this point then, the 
A Canadian soldier standing beside a CG-4A Glider 
during Exercise Eagle, 1949. (CFPU ZK 1141 -4) 
scenario for continental defence in 1946-1950 
was based on the need to prevent Soviet airborne 
forces from seizing and occupying forward 
bases from which other power projection forces 
could operate. These other forces might include 
strategic bombing aircraft carrying chemical, 
biological or atomic weapons, raiding parties, 
partisan support units or other diversionary 
forces which could seriously disrupt North 
America's ability to defend Western Europe 
and carry the war to the Soviet Union proper. 
The MSF in Embryo, 1946-1948 
Between 1945 and 1947, the Canadian Army at its wartime strength was reduced 
from 494,258 all ranks to 15,563. In this 
reorganization, an Active Force that included 
three infantry battalions, two armoured 
regiments, one artillery regiment, an engineer 
squadron and various support units was 
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created, while the Reserve Force theoretically 
could provide four infantry and two armoured 
divisions after a two year mobilization period. 
The initial t a sk of the Active Force was to t ra in 
the Reserve Force by keeping a cadre of skills 
available.17 
The 1946 Canada-U.S . Basic Security Plan 
d i s c u s s e d previous ly r equ i red C a n a d a to 
provide one airborne or air transportable brigade 
group a n d its a t t e n d a n t airlift as pa r t of the 
overall cont inenta l defence scheme. Initially, 
the Cabinet Defence Committee referred to th is 
commi tment as the Mobile Reserve, to be 
supplied from un i t s of the Active Force to 
prevent the Soviets from gaining a lodgement 
in North America. However, no p lans for its 
creat ion or composit ion were implemented 
before 1948. In 1948, the BSP requirement 
was reviewed in light of the Berlin Crisis and 
the Mobile Reserve was renamed the Mobile 
Str iking Force or MSF and more concrete 
p lanning took place. Also in 1948, the PJBD 
MCC formed a jo int sub-commit tee on mobile 
str iking forces; the implication of th is being 
tha t the MSF concept was a joint Canadian-
U.S. creation.1 8 
T h e c o n c e p t o f a n a i r b o r n e o r a i r 
t r a n s p o r t a b l e i n f a n t r y force c a p a b l e o f 
operat ing in an advanced arctic climate can be 
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Troops boarding a CI 19 Flying Boxcar. (CFPU PCN 2380) 
found dur ing the Second World War. Although 
t h e p o s t - w a r C a n a d i a n M S F w a s a n 
au tonomous Canadian formation, its genealogy 
can be t raced to the First Special Service Force 
w h i c h w a s a c o m b i n e d a i r b o r n e - t r a i n e d 
C a n a d i a n / A m e r i c a n u n i t e q u i p p e d w i t h 
oversnow vehic les originally conceived to 
conduct diversionary operat ions in Norway. 
Though i t never served th is purpose , one t a sk 
of the "Devil's Brigade" was the Kiska operat ion 
in the Aleut ians in 1943. As such , the "Devil's 
Brigade" provided the Canad ian Army with 
doctrinal experience in arctic and p a r a c h u t e 
operat ions. It also helped to consolidate an 
already cordial relationship with the U.S. Army, 
their operational me thods and equipment . 1 9 In 
addition, bo th the Canad ian and U.S. a rmies 
conducted extensive tes ts to evaluate clothing, 
weapons and vehicles within the context of 
br igade level exercises be tween 1945 and 
1947.2 0 
I t should be emphasized tha t in 1948 the 
MSF was a very rud imenta ry organization. The 
MSF did not exist as a formation in the same 
sense t ha t a brigade group of th ree ba t ta l ions 
does; the Active Force infantry bat ta l ions , 
engineers, artillery and services were located 
in many different locations across Canada . 
The Active Force itself did const i tu te a brigade 
group with a rmoured suppor t and i t did t ra in 
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for conventional combined arms operations on 
a limited basis. There was no MSF headquarters 
in 1948, no training higher than company level 
in p a r a c h u t e or arct ic opera t ions , no 
airtransportable oversnow vehicles nor was 
there any mechanism for coordinating with the 
RCAF, which was supposed to provide transport 
aircraft for the MSF.21 The Army Plans 
Committee had drawn up a brief in which the 
three infantry battalions, an engineer squadron 
and some service support could be formed into 
an MSF brigade group but there were too many 
of the above factors militating against its 
creation. Additionally, under the terms of the 
BSP, the MSF could be a i rborne or 
airtransportable but the method of delivery 
had not been decided upon in 1948.22 
Given this state of affairs within the context 
of the Berlin Crisis, the Army Plans Committee 
strongly recommended that these limitations 
be rectified so that Canada could meet the BSP 
requirement. In turn, the BSP requirement 
was altered so that the MSF could be fielded 
piecemeal if it was not ready as a coherent 
brigade formation. Thus, prior to May 1949, 
Canada was required to provide one parachute 
infantry battalion group on day 60 of a war, 
followed by one within 130 days and another in 
180 days. After May 1949, Canada was expected 
to have one ba t ta l ion group available 
immediately, followed by two battalions in the 
field within 60 and 120 days respectively.23 
In early 1948, the only airborne trained 
elements in the Canadian Army were one 
platoon from each of the three Active Force 
infantry bat tal ions; these made up the 
Canadian Special Air Service Company.24 By 
the summer of 1948, these elements were 
consolidated in one of the Active Force 
battalions, the Princess Patricia's Canadian 
Light Infantry, which then was entirely trained 
in the airborne role. The intent was to train the 
CI 19 dropping cargo through a bottom hatch. (CFPU PCN 2381) 
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other two infantry battalions in airborne 
operations and then form a complete MSF 
Brigade Group.25 Until this took place, the one 
existing airborne battalion would have to 
suffice. 
The concept of a battalion group is thus 
integral to understanding the MSF in the early 
period. The size of enemy forces attempting to 
seize forward bases were believed to be of 
company s t r e n g t h and th i s d ic ta ted 
counterattacking forces of equal or greater 
strength. Generally, the smallest formation 
incorporating artillery, engineers, medical and 
other service support in the Second World War 
was the division consisting' of three brigades. 
Since Canada in 1946-1948 possessed only 
one brigade with some artillery, engineers and 
service support, it was in a sense, a mini-
division and could operate independently in a 
conventional combined arms battle. 
Since only one battalion of the Active Force 
brigade was airborne trained for the MSF role, 
some of the services and support normally 
available to the brigade were allocated to the 
battalion so that the single airborne battalion 
itself could operate independently in the MSF 
role. This formation was called the battalion 
group and became the cornerstones for MSF 
operations before the other two battalions were 
trained. 
All equipment in the battalion group was 
airtransportable either by airdrop or glider. 
The four airborne infantry companies had their 
usual small arms, while the support company 
was equipped with 75 mm recoilless rifles and 
3" mortars. Since the battalion group was an 
autonomous formation, it also included an 
airborne artillery troop which could include 75 
mm pack howitzers, 4.2" mortars or both. A 
light anti-aircraft battery was also added, 
equipped with airtransportable 40 mm Bofors 
guns. Some thought was even given towards 
the acquisition of an airdroppable bulldozer 
that the engineer squadron could use to create 
an airstrip. The 75 mm pack howitzers and the 
75 mm recoilless rifles were added after 
Exercises ADONIS and EAGLE in 1949 which 
demonstrated the need to increase the firepower 
available to the battalion group.26 Although 
the M29C Weasel oversnow vehicle was large 
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and required disassembly for the C-47 aircraft, 
the transport platoon was equipped with them 
on paper.27 
To overcome the problems of mobility from 
dispersed location, the MSF was made both 
airborne and airtransportable in accordance 
with the original MCC concept. Since only one 
battalion was airborne trained in 1948-1949, 
the other battalions and support formations 
were designated airtransportable. The artillery 
was supposed to be airlanded by glider with the 
airborne force, while the rest of the MSF loaded 
on transport aircraft landed on an airfield 
secured by the airborne battalion.28 
Thus far the MSF was an embryonic 
formation at the beginning of 1949. Only one 
third of its approved strength was airborne 
qualified, though the entire organization was 
equipped for operations. No liaison system 
with the RCAF existed. Only two maj or exercises 
were conducted between 1947 and 1949, not 
really a true test of the MSF concept though 
enough to conduct acclimatization tests for 
men and machines.29 
The MSF Matures, 1949-1955 
Exercise EAGLE in August 1949 was an important milestone in the short life of the 
MSF. Designed to validate Army-RCAF 
cooperation within the MSF concept, the tactical 
scenario was based on the requirement to 
reduce an "enemy lodgement" located at an 
airfield at Fort St. John, B.C. EAGLE featured 
the use of both parachute and gliderborne 
troops as well as close air support from RCAF 
reserve fighter squadrons. More importantly, 
EAGLE was instrumental in pointing out the 
many limitations that the MSF had to function 
under, primarily the lack of air support, the 
need for close fighter escort of the transport 
aircraft, problems in Army-RCAF cooperation, 
the need for security of forward based support 
units and the lack of firepower inherent to the 
battalion group. These limitations, which were 
displayed for all to see in the Canadian media, 
were instrumental in mobilizing public pressure 
and forcing the Canadian government to 
improve the MSF's capability.30 
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The problems of command and control 
were addressed by the Army Planning 
Committee in 1949. Since 
any air movemen t s 
necessitated coordination 
with the RCAF, the 
establishment of an MSF 
headquarters was imperative. 
It was uneconomical to have 
three independent formations 
of battalion size controlled 
directly from Ottawa, even 
though this might facilitate 
coordination with the RCAF. 
The RCAF "played ball" and 
created a Tactical Group 
Headquarters (Tac Gp HQ) to 
handle air movements and 
tactical air support to MSF 
operations. This eventually 
A C-4 7 Dakota being unloaded of 
technical equipment and luggage 
at Cambridge Bay, N.W.T. during 
Operation Musk-Ox, 20 March 
1946. 
(Photo by R.W. Martin 
DND/NAC PA 134304) 
A "Penguin" oversnow vehicle refuels 
an RCAF Norseman in the Arctic during 
Operation Musk-Ox, 17 March 1946. 
(Photo by R.W. Martin 
DND/NAC PA 134303) 
would become integral to the 
proposed MSF br igade 
headquarters, which would have 
an "Army Component" and an "Air 
Force Component . " This 
arrangement was not permanent 
and only was formed for exercises 
and ope ra t ions . T h u s , by 
November 1949 the MSF 
h e a d q u a r t e r s problem was 
partially alleviated and a Joint 
Army/Air H e a d q u a r t e r s was 
established in Winnipeg.31 
There was , however, the 
nagging question of airlift. Since 
i ts incept ion, the MSF was 
h indered with a pauc i ty of 
transport aircraft. Throughout the late 1940s, 
Canadian defence planners rigidly adhered to 
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the BSP commitment of three troop carrier 
squadrons. This constituted the entire RCAF 
strength of 30 C-47 Dakota aircraft, each being 
capable of transporting 15-20 parachutists 
and their equipment. In essential terms, 30 C-
47s could move most of a single battalion 
group in one lift. To transport the artillery 
troops and other vehicles, 8 CG-4A Hadrian 
gliders were available, though recovery after 
an operation remained an unsolved problem.32 
Canadian planners determined that 20 North 
Star long range transports would be available 
within one month of a conflict commencing. 
The North Star however was limited in numbers 
and had a plethora of other taskings.33 
In the early 1950s the RCAF purchased 35 
C119 Flying Boxcar assault transports, ofwhich 
12 were allocated to the MSF at any one time. 
Though this did improve the airlift situation 
somewhat, MSF planners believed that 24 
additional C119s would be required to conduct 
two battalion group operations simultaneously 
if all other C-47 and North Star assets were 
used, or 114 CI 19s to move the entire MSF.34 
With the u s u a l ma in tenance problems 
associated with flying machines added to the 
multiplicity of tasks, the entire strength of 
transport aircraft allocated to the MSF could 
never be utilized at the same time. However, 
for tactical air support the RCAF pledged two 
squadrons of B-25 Mitchell light bombers from 
the air reserve; these would prove their value in 
later exercises in the long range reconnaissance 
and attack role.35 In effect, the MSF would be 
hard pressed to conduct more than two different 
battalion group operations at the same time. 
Organization of the MSF did not change 
significantly after 1949. In addition to the 
command changes referred to earlier, the intent 
of Army Headquarters was to have three 
battalion groups available for MSF operations. 
However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 and the sudden Canadian commitment 
of one brigade group to NATO's integrated force 
in Europe in 1951 placed a great strain on 
mobilization and training in the army. In 
addition to its MSF role and its Reserve Force 
cadre training role, Active Force units had to 
provide cadre personnel to the Canadian Army 
Special Force (later 25th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade Group) mobilized for Korea and the 
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Panda Brigade (27th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
Group) allocated to Germany. As such, MSF 
planners in Ottawa were greatly concerned: 
it is noted with alarm that the operational effectiveness 
of the Mobile Striking Force has been so reduced and 
continues to be threatened by the present expansion 
of the army . . .36 
The threat estimate for 1950 concluded 
that "the possibility of a larger scale landing 
with more serious intentions [other than 
diversionary] cannot be overlooked entirely 
but it deserves secondary consideration"37 and 
as a result, one option open to MSF planners 
was to form company groups out of the battalion 
groups by reallocating service and support 
elements to even smaller formations if smaller 
operations were required. Given the limits on 
air transport, the planning staff thought ten C-
47 Dakotas would be sufficient lift.38 
It does appear that two fully trained 
battalions were available for MSF operations 
during 1950-1951. Some thought was given to 
eliminating the MSF brigade headquarters, 
allocating one battalion each to the Western 
Command and the Eastern Command and 
calling the organization the Northern Combat 
Force. This idea was dropped since it included 
a proposal to forward base the company groups 
in the northern regions; this would have had 
severe morale repercussions and would have 
limited the ability of the MSF to react to a larger 
threat.39 The Cabinet Defence Committee in its 
1951 Service Programme continued to authorize 
one brigade group headquarters, three infantry 
battalions, one artillery battery, one engineer 
squadron and supporting services for the 
defence of North America exclusive of the 
expansion of the Field Army.40 Thus, by 1951, 
MSF planners still emphasized the three 
bat ta l ion group concept and the jo int 
headquarters system. 
The missions of the MSF expanded after 
1950. In addition to lodgement reduction and 
counterinsurgency against "partisans," a study 
A soldier from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light 
Infantry poses for the camera during a break in 
Exercise Sweetbriar in 1950. (CFPU ZK 1136-2) 
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was done to determine how the Army could 
contribute to the defence of two very important 
u r a n i u m mines a t Port Radium and 
Beaverlodge, NWT. By 1953, these mines were 
providing more than 50 per cent of the uranium 
requ i red to c o n s t r u c t nuc l ea r and 
thermonuclear weapons in the United States. 
It was believed that, if uranium production 
were interfered with by an airborne raid, 
bombing or sabotage, the development of the 
nuclear deterrent force that NATO relied on 
could be seriously affected.41 Though Canadian 
planners decided that the stationing of a 
permanent force was not feasible, the MSF 
could have a role in counterattacking and 
retaking the facilities in an emergency. 
Similarly, studies were conducted into 
finding the best means of defending the Alaska 
Highway system subject to BSP planning and 
MCC approval. The most obvious candidate 
for a blocking force should the enemy try to 
exploit down the highway was the MSF. 
However, after the problems encountered 
during Exercise EAGLE and a later U.S.-
Canad ian exercise, SWEETBRIAR, this 
responsibility was transferred to an armoured 
car squadron of the Active Force armoured 
unit, the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal 
Canadians), and elements of the Reserve Force. 
However, if push came to shove, the only 
formation that could reach the highway system 
rapidly was elements of the MSF; therefore, 
this was another possible tasking.42 
In the same vein, the security of elements 
for the American Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
based in Canada was another possible task. In 
1951, 
The Canadian Section of the Board [PJBD] was 
informed that the War Department [U.S.] regarded 
Goose Bay as probably the most strategically 
important air base in the Western Hemisphere . . ,43 
This was no exaggeration. In addition to serving 
as the main staging bases for transport and 
fighter aircraft heading to and from Europe, 
five different radar stations and two squadrons 
of USAFF-94B Scorpion interceptors allocated 
for the air defence of North America were 
stationed there. More importantly, USAF KC-
97 Stratotanker aircraft used to aerial refuel B-
36 Peacekeeper and B-47 Stratojet nuclear 
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deterrent bombers frequently used Goose Bay 
as their base.44 If Goose Bay or the SAC base 
at Thule, Greenland were occupied by an enemy 
airborne force, NATO would lose a vital resupply 
link; worse, the nuclear deterrent on which 
NATO security was based would be threatened. 
The intervention of the Chinese into the 
Korean War in late 1950 he igh tened 
in t e rna t iona l t ens ion and p rompted a 
r eexamina t ion of C a n a d i a n and U.S. 
continental defence planning. The Cabinet 
Defence Committee recommended in November 
1950 that: 
. . . the Committee be authorized to study as a matter 
of urgency, preparations that could be made within 
the next few months to meet the dangers of air attack 
on central Ottawa in the event of war within the next 
twelve months . . ,4S 
The PJBD MCC planners were already way 
ahead of the politicians. The General Officers, 
Commanding of Eas tern Command and 
Western Command were authorized to conduct 
defence planning liaison with their American 
counterparts, Commander U.S. FirstArmyand 
Commander U.S. Sixth Army respectively. The 
defence of Alaska was the responsibility of a 
separate command, U.S. Commander in Chief, 
Alaska (CinCAL); GOC Western Command was 
tasked to liaise with it. By this point, the basic 
Security Plan of 1946 had evolved (in name 
only) into the Canada-U.S. Emergency Defence 
Plan (EDP) or MCC 300/2.4 6 
The gist of MCC 300/2 allowed for the 
deployment of one U.S. Regimental Combat 
Team (RCT-American version of the brigade 
group) to Greenland (Plan DIAMOND), one RCT 
to Alaska,47 one U.S. RCT would be deployed 
alongside a Canadian MSF battalion group in 
New Brunswick, P.E.I, or Nova Scotia if 
necessary (Plan GARNET). Newfoundland, 
Labrador, the North West territories and the 
Yukon were to be the responsibility of two MSF 
battalion groups and a third if one was not 
needed in the Maritimes. Plan SAPPHIRE 
allowed for the deployment of an MSF battalion 
group to the New England states if warranted.48 
Some additional thought was given to the use 
of MSF units in Plan DIAMOND but this was 
ruled out by Canadian planners who already 
had enough on their plate.49 
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It should be noted here that in 1950, the 
Americans determined that the minimum 
American forces required for the defence of 
Alaska was three Regimental Combat Teams, 
one of which was to be based on the MSF 
concept of airborne/airtransported battalion 
groups, along with appropriate airlift. Since 
CinCAL's objective included the denial of Alaska 
as an offensive base of operations, an additional 
"Arctic RCT" was scheduled into the MCC 300/ 
2 plan: These forces will also be prepared for 
operations in support of Canadian forces in 
Canada,50 while Canadian forces would support 
CinCAL if necessa ry . By 1952, the 
arrangements for the defence of Alaska and the 
Yukonbecame the subject of a separate defence 
plan called ALCANUS EDP 51, which was 
created within the context of MCC 300/2.51 
The aforementioned Exercise SWEETBRIARin 
1950 was one joint Canadian-U.S. exercise 
designed to examine the defence of the Canadian 
northwest. 
In addition to the uranium mines, air bases, 
air strips, U.S. LORAN sites and radar sites, 
the Department of National Defence possessed 
an extensive naviga t iona l aid and 
communications network, all of which could 
become targets for raids and other enemy 
action. With these additional missions and 
given the fact that the MSF formations were 
spread out all over the southernmost areas of 
Canada, a system of forward basing was created 
to improve reaction time over the vast expanse 
of the Canadian North. 
Main bases for administration, logistical 
and operational control of the operation were 
required. Since these needed to be located at 
existing airfields near the locations of the MSF 
units, Edmonton, Three Rivers, Montreal and 
Moncton were selected as MSF Main Bases. 
Since logistical support for the MSF was 
dependent upon aerial resupply, items such as 
fuel, spare parts and rations were pre-
positioned at civilian-manned advanced bases 
in peacetime. These advanced bases would 
then serve as the forward sites from which the 
airborne assault would be launched against an 
enemy lodgement. MSF advanced bases were 
located at Whitehorse, Fort Nelson, Yellowknife, 
Churchill, FortChimo, Frobisher Bay and Goose 
Bay allowing for extremely flexible movement 
across the Canadian northern approaches. 
Depending where the threat originated, the 
MSF unit could be mobilized at its home station 
and moved by air, highway or rail to the nearest 
MSF main base. Then, assault elements would 
be transported from the main base by non-
tactical airlift to the advanced base and the 
operation could then be conducted. After 
performing the tactical air assault from the 
advanced base, MSF engineers would improve 
the airhead to allow follow up glider or other 
airlandings. Once sufficient forces were on the 
ground at the airhead, a ground attack would 
take place against the enemy lodgement while 
casualties were evacuated back to the main 
base.52 
Troops exiting from a CG-4A Hadrian glider during Exercise Eagle. (CFPU ZK 1141-6) 
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Thus, by 1951, a firm doctrinal concept of 
MSF operations existed based on the experience 
gained since 1948. Certain deficiencies such 
as the lack of airlift and the needs of the 25th 
and 27th Brigades militated against the full 
and simultaneous utilization of the Active Force 
Brigade Group's three MSF battalion groups; 
the MSF staff consistently emphasized that: 
if th i s force is to be an emergency force it m u s t be 
t r a i n e d n o w even i f i t s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l s t h e 
convent ional br igade concen t ra t ions . . . we [must] 
bend all our energies towards prepar ing the Mobile 
Str iking Force for i ts pr ime role t h a t of preserving 
inviolate Canad i an terri tory . . .53 
This state of affairs continued between 1951 
and 1955, the "halcyon years" of the MSF. No 
less than eleven MSF exercises, with colourful 
and uncolourful names like LOUP GAROU and 
PRAIRIE TUNDRA were conducted during this 
time, some in conjunction with the Americans 
providing more experience in arctic operations 
and validation of the MSF concept. However, 
even by 1955, the forces involved in Exercise 
BULLDOG III never exceeded a single battalion 
group.54 
The decline of the MSF after 1955 was the 
result of many factors, not the least was the 
Soviet development in the mid-1950s of long 
range jet bombers such as the TU-16 Badger, 
the MYA-4 Bison and TU-20 Bear all of which 
could be aerial refuelled. This made obsolete 
the TU-4's forward basing requirement. The 
abili ty of these new aircraft to carry 
thermonuclear bombs in the megaton range 
posed a greater and more efficient threat to 
bases like Goose Bay than any party from a 
Soviet Guards Airborne division. The age of all 
consuming thermonuclear weapons eliminated 
most continental defence thinking from the 
land force point of view and focused it on air 
defence and NO RAD; the era of flexible response 
and the limits of nuclear power had yet to be 
demonstrated clearly. As a result, the MSF 
waxed and waned in the late 1950s. By 1957, 
airborne continental defence had come full 
circle as one company group from each of three 
infantry battalions based in Canada were 
assigned to the ambiguous "Defence of Canada 
Force" which pos se s sed no br igade 
headquarters or joint liaison with the RCAF. 
86 
By the early 1960s, the DCF was whittled down 
to a token company group.55 
In the final measure, the MSF provided 
many positive benefits to Canada and Canadian 
defence in the 1946-1955 period. First, since 
many MSF exercises were widely covered in the 
media, the "man in the street" had something 
tangible to grasp onto regarding the defence of 
his nation, not something to belittle during the 
early part of the Cold War. Secondly, 
cooperation with the Americans at all levels 
preserved Canadian sovereignty. At the political 
policy level, Canada was an equal partner 
which was remarkable given the various 
disparities between the U.S. and Canada. At 
the military operational level, Canadian military 
personnel from an extremely flexible unit were 
able to work side by side with their American 
counterparts on an equal basis planning for 
the defence of North America. At the military 
tactical level, the exchange of ideas, doctrine 
and equipment was also significant. Thirdly, 
the MSF assisted in maintaining deterrence, 
not only by protecting the means to create a 
nuclear deterrent but by protecting the means 
of delivering it. Fourthly, the creation of a body 
of doctrine and experience in arctic operations 
allowed Canada to prepare for eventualities 
like the Norway commitment within NATO in 
the late 1960s. In closing, the MSF served 
certain elements of Canada's defence needs for 
a discrete period before fading into obscurity; 
i ts c o n t r i b u t i o n s were somewha t 
disproportionate to its numbers and it should 
not be forgotten. 
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